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I. Introduction
Thisisaninterestingandchallengingpaper,inwhichAtkesonandKehoe
put forth a very strong critique of current mainstream monetary policy
analysis. Monetary economists have, of course, been rather pleased with
the development of their subject over the past 10–15 years, current U.S.
policy difficulties notwithstanding. Indeed, the tone of a prominent re-
centexpositorypaperbymycolleague,MarvinGoodfriend,issomewhat
triumphal in spirit.
1 The spirit of the Atkeson and Kehoe paper, by con-
trast,isconveyedbyarecentpublicationoftheirs,togetherwithcoauthor
Fernando Alvarez, which bears the title “If Exchange Rates Are Random
Walks, Then Almost Everything We Say about Monetary Policy Is
Wrong” (Alvarez, Atkeson, and Kehoe 2007). That paper focuses on ex-
change rate failures, whereas the current one stresses the term structure
of interest rates, but the line of argument is basically the same.
Thetitleofthe2007paperleadsmerathernaturallytoaskmyselfwhat
it is that I would say in answer to the implied question, “What im-
portant things do monetary economists really know—or at least believe—
about monetary policy?” My own answer to that question would go
along the following lines: (i) We believe that if the monetary authority
keeps monetary policy expansionary for a substantial length of time,
themaineffectwillbetogenerateahigherinflationratethanwouldhave
prevailed otherwise, with little or no overall effect on aggregate produc-
tionandemployment.(ii)Nominalinterestrateswillbehigher,also,with
real rates being affected very little. (iii) If, however, the monetary author-
ity changes policy unexpectedly and abruptly in an expansionary direc-
tion, there will most likely be an expansion in aggregate output and
employment—but it will be only temporary. (iv) If these changes are in
the direction of tighter policy, the signs of the above‐mentioned effects
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to generate a recession, in which output and then the inflation rate will
fall. (vi) The precise nature of the mechanism that generates the real ef-
fects ofmonetarypolicychangesofthis typeisnotverywellunderstood.
Then, if my questioner had not wandered away in boredom, I would
wanttoaddsomethinglikethefollowing:(vii)Theforegoingpointsrefer
to an expansionary or contractionary monetary policy stance—loose or
tight—but how is this measured? Well, a sustained high growth rate of
the stock of base money will (under most institutional arrangements) be
expansionary, but matters are a little less clear‐cut when the central bank
actually carries out its policy by manipulating overnight interest rates.
Nevertheless, there are ways in which we can characterize tighter versus
looser policy in terms of interest rate rules by reference to the implied
target inflation rate, the strength of responses to deviations from target,
and so forth.
Now, I suspect that Atkeson and Kehoe probably do not disagree
with most of these statements as to what monetary economists know
(or believe), even on a substantive basis.
2 But their title of the cur-
rent paper, as distinct from the 2007 item, refers to a need for a new
approach to monetary policy analysis. So let us turn to a consideration
of what today’s mainstream approach is. As it happens there is a short
statement of that type, in a paper of mine, that gives the following de-
scription. The approach is one in which “the researcher specifies a
quantitative macroeconomic model that is intended to be structural (in-
variant to policy changes) and consistent with both theory and data.
Then, by stochastic simulation or analytical means, he determines
how crucial variables (such as inflation and the output gap) behave
onaverageundervariousalternativepolicyrules.Usually,rationalex-
pectations (RE) is assumed in both stages. Evaluation of the different
outcomes can be accomplished by means of an optimal control exer-
cise, or by reference to an explicit loss function, or left to the judgment
(i.e.,lossfunction)oftheimpliedpolicymaker” (McCallum2001,258).
Here, too, I doubt that Atkeson and Kehoe have any major disagree-
ment with this general approach. What they do disagree with, if I un-
derstand at all, is the model that is typically used in recent work and
taken to be structural.
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In a sense my last statement could be regarded as merely quibbling
over their title. But the point seems to be one of some importance: if
Atkeson and Kehoe can generate an optimizing model that incorpo-
rates reliable, quantitative estimates reflecting time‐varying “risk” (i.e.,
state‐dependent variances and covariances) and endogenously explains
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sumably be happy to incorporate such features in their models—and
would not considerthistoreflectany basically newapproach. Bethatasit
may,inwhatfollowsIwillbrieflyreviewtheirfeaturedempirical regular-
ities, discuss issues concerning their suggested modeling strategy, and
provide a brief conclusion.
II. Empirical Regularities
Atkeson and Kehoe begin, in Section I, with “four key regularities re-
garding the dynamics of interest rates and risk that we use to guide our
construction” of a model and its pricing kernel. The first two pertain to
a principal components analysis of a collection of interest rates, specif-
ically, a 3‐month T‐bill rate and zero‐coupon yields on U.S. Treasury
securities with k‐year maturities for k ¼ 1; 2,…, 13. Time series obser-
vations are monthly over 1946.12–2007.12. The first regularity is that
“the first principal component accounts for over 90% of the variance
of the short rate [i.e., the 3‐month rate].” The second regularity is that
“the second principal component is very similar to the yield spread be-
tween the short rate and the long [i.e., 13‐year] rate.” Having demon-
strated these facts—and also that the first component is correlated even
more strongly with the long rate—the authors henceforth use just the
short and long rates.
More substantively (and more questionably), the third and fourth
regularities pertain to expected excess returns in the context of term
structure and international exchange rate contexts. Specifically, move-
ments in yield spreads and exchange rate premia are “associated with
movements in risk.” The way in which these regularities might be re-
garded by some readers as questionable is that, in many studies, “risk”
is operationally the name that is given to differentials in expected re-
turns that the analyst’s model is not able to explain.
Later in the paper, in Section V.A, Atkeson and Kehoe plot short‐rate
and long‐rate time series for the United States over an extended period
from 1836 through 2007. In addition, they include analogous plots for
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In all of
these, the fluctuations of the long rate represent “a much smaller frac-
tion of overall fluctuations in the short rate than they are in the postwar
period.” Thus, they state: “A central question in the analysis of mone-
tary policy at the secular level then is, What institutional changes led to
this pattern?” In the preliminary version of this comment, I responded
to a more pointed and strongly emphasized version of this query by
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rates became unanchored during the post–World War II period, be-
cause, to again quote myself,
[the] collapse of the Bretton Woods system created, for the first time
in history, a situation in which the world’s leading central banks were
responsible for conducting monetary policy without an externally im-
posed monetary standard (often termed a “nominal anchor”). Pre-
viously, central banks had normally operated under the constraint of
some metallic standard (e.g., a gold or silver standard), with wartime
departures being understood to be temporary, i.e., of limited duration.
SomereadersmightnotthinkoftheBrettonWoodssystemasoneincor-
porating a metallic standard, but by design it certainly was, since the
values of all other currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar and the lat-
ter was pegged to gold at $35 per ounce. (McCallum 1999, 175–76)
All in all, it seems that there is no difficulty in understanding why an
altered monetary policy regime generated different expectations regard-
ing inflation and therefore future short interest rates in the post–World
War II era. The variability in long rates during the 1960s developed as
market participants began to see that the United States was not going
to be bound by its commitment to maintain the $35 per ounce price of
gold.ThenthevariabilityjumpsuparoundthetimeoftheBrettonWoods
collapse in 1971—see Atkeson and Kehoe’sf i g u r e s6 A–6E—and con-
tinues to rise into the Volcker disinflation that was painful (with ex-
tremely high nominal interest rates) but that ultimately succeeded in
restoring some semblance of a nominal anchor.
What about the return to stability that may have occurred around
1990? That year is, of course, the year in which the first central bank
(New Zealand) officially adopted a monetary policy regime of “infla-
tion targeting” (IT). At that time, this was taken to mean a policy whose
only objective was a low and stable inflation rate. Since then, the IT
t e r mh a sc o m et ob ea p p l i e dt or e g i m e st h a tg i v em o r ew e i g h tt oo u t p u t /
employment stabilization, but most monetary economists understand it
as continuing to emphasize, as the primary goal, inflation control. So
again the timing is about right for the possible recovery of anchored ex-
pectations that the first empirical regularity is said to reflect.
To this general line of argument, Atkeson and Kehoe object: “But this
answer is, at best, superficial. In the prewar era, countries chose to be on
the gold standard most of the time and chose to leave it when it suited
their purposes. Thus, the relevant questions are, rather, What deeper
forces led agents to have confidence that their governments would
choosestablepolicyoverthelongterm?Andwhatforcesledthemtolose
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forthishistorycanwegive adviceonhowtoavoidanothergreatinflation.”
In this regard it must be said that I consider an explanation of the
evolution of beliefs regarding the monetary standard, held by citizens
of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and so forth, to be some-
what beyond the scope of monetary policy analysts. To think about this
issue, one must recognize that historically “the gold standard” required
not just that the monetary authority would stand ready to exchange
gold and currency at a specified rate but also that this rate should be
unchanged “forever.” That arrangement made it such that severe infla-
tion would not occur—even the major historical gold discoveries did
not generate sustained inflation on the order of 10% per year—but it
did generate more cyclical instability of real variables than we have
had in the postwar era. Could policy of that type win popular support
in today’s environment in the United States? If not, which would be my
answer, then we need an entire unified social science to provide an ex-
planation at “a deeper level.” And such an explanation—which would
need to emphasize enormous developments in the media, extensions of
suffrage, evolution of religious beliefs, attitudes toward the role of gov-
ernment, and so on—would not be of much help to central bankers. Let
us turn then to monetary policy analysis considered more narrowly.
III. Basic Analysis
The heart of Atkeson and Kehoe’s paper is a recommended response to
the third and fourth of the regularities mentioned above, that is, that
measured excess returns on multiperiod bonds fluctuate strongly with
yield spreads for bonds of different maturities and for international ex-
change rates. These regularities are translated by Atkeson and Kehoe
into an argument that the consumption Euler equation, some version
of which (often termed an expectational IS equation) is one basic ingre-
dient of current macro‐monetary models, performs very poorly empiri-
cally. This is, of course, true for the simplest versions, but that problem
has been widely recognized by monetary economists. A nice overview
of empirical weaknesses of so‐called New Keynesian models was pro-
vided some years ago in a working paper by Richard Dennis (2003),
which is briefly and nontechnically summarized in Dennis (2004).
(The weaknesses discussed there relate to the Calvo‐style price adjust-
ment relation, as well as the consumption Euler equation.) Dennis dis-
tinguishes between the bare‐bones “canonical model” and a “hybrid”
version that adds habit formation in consumption behavior to the basic
Comment 453consumption‐saving relationship and also adds a somewhat dubious
dependence on lagged inflation to the basic Calvo price adjustment re-
lation. He recognizes, following Estrella and Fuhrer (2002), that “the
problem with the canonical model is that the behavior of output, con-
sumption, prices, and interest rates suggested by the model are funda-
mentally at odds with observed data” (Dennis 2004, 1). The hybrid
model performs better, in terms of matching quarterly data, but “there
are a number of areas where the hybrid model’s responses differ impor-
tantly from” impulse responses of an identified vector autoregression
(VAR; Dennis 2004, 3).
The point here is that monetary economists are quite aware that cur-
rent models, even with elaborations of the type utilized by Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2007), have em-
pirical weaknesses, and they have been active in trying to eliminate
these problems by improved specification. One pertinent and recent ex-
ample concerns the discouraging results reported by Canzoneri, Cumby,
and Diba (2007), that is, that inclusion of habit formation in con-
sumption behavior unrealistically increases the variability of interest
rates.
4 Subsequent results by Collard and Dellas (2007) indicate,
however, that this deterioration obtains when the household utility
function is taken to be additively separable in consumption and leisure.
If instead consumption and leisure enter the function in a Cobb‐Douglas
manner, then inclusion of habit results in an improved—not worsened—
match of the model’s interest rate variability to that of the data.
I might also remark that Atkeson and Kehoe’s way of considering the
empirical failure of the Euler equation seems questionable. Specifically,
they discuss the relationship in a manner that would be appropriate if
the role of this equation were to explain movements in nominal interest
rates of various maturities. In fact, however, the role of this equation in
standard monetary policy models is to explain consumption in re-
sponse to (real) interest rates and expected future consumption (and,
in habit specifications, lagged consumption). No mention of the ade-
quacy or inadequacy of the standard model’s properties with regard
to consumption is provided.
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Bethatasitmay,itisessentialtoconsidertheanalyticalheartofAtkeson
and Kehoe's paper, which is their presentation of “a simple model of the
pricing kernel that is consistent with these [observed] dynamics” pertain-
ing to interest rates. For the one‐period nominal interest rate, it in their
notation,thepricingkernelmt+1isanunobservable randomvariablethat
is generated by a stochastic process such that the interest rate it can be
McCallum 454determined by a relation of the form it ¼  log Etexpðmtþ1Þ: Assuming
conditional lognormality, then, we have
it ¼  Etðmtþ1Þ 0:5Var tðmtþ1Þ: ð1Þ
Except for lognormality, the content of their model for it is then the spec-
ification of the stochastic process generating mt+1. They take it to be
  mtþ1 ¼ δ þ z1t þ σ1ε1tþ1  ½ 1  ð λ2=2Þ z2t þ z0:5
2t λε2tþ1 þ σ3ε3tþ1; ð2Þ
where ε1t; ε2t; and ε3t are independent, standard normal, white‐noise
innovations and where
z1tþ1 ¼ z1t þ σ1ε1tþ1; ð3Þ
z2tþ1 ¼ð 1   φÞθ þ φz2t þ z0:5
2t σ2ε2tþ1: ð4Þ
These processes are chosen with an eye to their implications for the
term structure via the relation
1 ¼ Et exp
 




which characterizes an absence of arbitrage possibilities for k‐period
bonds with prices, pk 1
tþ1 . From these prices the analyst can calculate
term structure measures.





, φ ¼ 0:99; and σ2 ¼ 0:017.Thisspecificationsuffices,theyreport,
togenerateinterestratesofdifferentmaturitiessuchthatthetermstructure
features long and short rates that possess properties that have the general
characteristics found in their exploration of monthly data for rates of var-
ious maturities in the U.S. data.
Howdoesthismodelcompareinspecificationwiththestandardthree‐
equation framework used in recent years to model one‐period interest
rates, consumption (and/or output), and inflation by Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1999),McCallum(2001), Woodford (2003, 238–47), and dozens of
other monetary economists? That framework, as is well known, consists
of (i) a consumption Euler equation (aka expectational IS relation), (ii) a
price adjustment relation (usually of the Calvo variety), and (iii) a mone-
tary policyrule that specifies adjustments of the one‐period nominalpol-
icy rate it to its determinants, which include the steady state real interest
rate, the central bank’s inflation target, departures of inflation from tar-
get, and departures of output from its natural (flexible price) rate. (The
laggedrateit‐1isoftenincludedaswelltorepresentsmoothing.)Thisframe-
work implicitly adopts the expectations theory of the term structure, which
is known to be inconsistent with the data. Notable examples of larger
Comment 455modelsthatincludemorevariablesandequationsbutthathavethesame




adjustments are complete within each period so that output is always
equal to its (exogenous) natural rate, flexible price value. Only a degen-
erate version of the Calvo equation component of the standard model
is therefore present. That removes one endogenous variable, output/
consumption. For some purposes, a flexible price model can be useful
for monetary policy principles, as in Woodford (2003, chap. 2). But
Atkeson and Kehoe also treat inflation as exogenous. Thus, there is no
possibility remaining for conducting monetary policy analysis, and it is
not determined by central bank behavior. Those features are consistent
withtheirexpressedviewthatthecentralbank“simplyrespondstoexoge-
nous changes in real risk—specifically, to exogenous changes in the con-
ditional variance of the real pricing kernel—with the aim of maintaining
inflation close to a target level.” But this seems highly unsatisfactory. It is
probably true that a substantial portion of the meeting‐to‐meeting varia-
tions in the federal funds rate in the United States represents adjust-
ments that are responses to changes in real rates that are brought
about by changes in tastes, technology, shocks from abroad, and even
perhapssomerandombehavioralerrorsbyprivateagents.Infact,this
is implied by much of the analysis that represents today’sm a i n s t r e a m
monetary policy analysis—see, for example, Woodford (2003, chaps. 4
and7).ButthemodelingapproachsuggestedbyAtkesonandKehoeevi-
dently implies that the Fed somehow accomplishes its (entirely random)
objectives perfectly (except for a random error ε3t that is arbitrarily in-
serted) although it takes no tangible actions in a systematic manner.
Furthermore, no evidence is provided that their model would do a de-
cent job of matching data on inflation, much less output. Without those
two variables treated as endogenous and potentially influenced by cen-
tralbankactions,describedbyapolicyruleforafeasibleinstrumentvari-
able, the model is simply not suitable in principle for monetary analysis.
IV. Conclusion
Atkeson and Kehoe are correct to say that the Euler equation specifica-
tion in many NK monetary models does not perform well empirically.
In addition, their specification of stochastic processes for the z1t and z2t
variables that yield a pricing kernel that implies term structure features
McCallum 456that match the data in important ways is skillful and ingenious. They
seem correct in suggesting that models in which conditional variances
of asset returns are variable provide an attractive possibility for im-
proved model specification. This viewpoint is not new, of course, and
does not require treatment of inflation and output as exogenous or re-
quire adherence to a model that leads to their highly unorthodox con-
clusions about the nature of actual monetary policy in the United States
(and, presumably, other nations and currency areas). There is a growing
branch of the finance‐oriented monetary policy literature that includes
nontrivial term structure formulations that presume arbitrage‐free pric-
ing with time‐varying risk premia in models along with endogenous
consumption/saving choices, gradual price adjustments, and plausible
monetarypolicyrules.SomeleadingexamplesareprovidedbyGallmeyer,
Hollifield, and Zin (2005), Piazzesi and Schneider (2006), Gallmeyer et al.
(2007), and Palomino (2007).
6 These have gone far beyond Atkeson and
Kehoe in attempting to specify models that match the term structure reg-
ularities while maintaining a framework usable for monetary policy anal-
y s i s .F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h ea p p r o a c hf e a t u r i n gt i m e ‐varying conditional
covariances is not the only one worthy of consideration, as the Collard
and Dellas (2007) example illustrates. In sum, I am impressed by as-
p e c t so ft h eA t k e s o na n dK e h o ec r i t i q u eo fs o m ef e a t u r e so ft o d a y ’s
New Keynesian monetary policy models, but I find their current pro-
posal to be unsatisfactory in essential ways, their characterization of ac-
tual U.S.monetary policy tobeunconvincing,and theircritiqueofcurrent
monetary policy analysis to be drastically overstated.
Endnotes
1. See “How the World Achieved Consensus on Monetary Policy” (Goodfriend 2007).
2. They would probably grumble, justifiably, about the vagueness of point vii.
3. McCallum (2001, 258) goes on to say: “There is also considerable agreement about the
general, broad structure of the macroeconomic model to be used.” Atkeson and Kehoe
clearly would not share in this agreement.
4. The Canzoneri et al. (2007) paper is cited by Atkeson and Kehoe.
5. Atkeson and Kehoe seem, moreover, to believe (counterfactually) that standard specifi-
cations have Euler equations that include no disturbance term reflecting preference shocks.
6. For a brief literature review, see Palomino (2007, 5–6).
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